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ABSTRACT
Norway experienced internet voting in 2011 and 2013 for municipal and parliamentary elections respectively. Its security
depends on the assumptions that the involving organizations are completely independent, reliable, and the receipt codes
are securely sent to the voters. In this paper, we point out the following aspects:
• The vote privacy of Norwegian scheme is violated if Ballot Box and Receipt Generator cooperate since the private
key of Decryption Service can be obtained by the two former players. We propose a solution to avoid this issue
without adding new players.
• To assure the correctness, the receipt codes are sent to the voters over a pre-channel (postal service) and a post-
channel (SMS). However, by holding both SMS and the postal receipt code, a voter can reveal his vote even after
the elections. Albeit revoting is a fairly well solution for coercion or concealment, intentional vote revealing is still
a problem. We suggest SMS only for notification of vote submission.
• In case the codes are falsely generated or the pre-channel is not secure, a vote can be counted for a different candidate
without detection. We propose a solution in which voters verify the integrity of the postal receipt codes.
KEYWORDS
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system, the system may deceive voters and coercers may
influence on voters. Moreover, the voting system should be
usable and understandable by the whole voting population,
notwithstanding age or disability. Furthermore, voters are
generally assumed to have neither computer literacy nor
the computing power. For this reason, the e-voting systems
should be simple and user-friendly. If the required security
goals are satisfied, then it can be a great advancement over
the classical paper-based voting systems.
Electronic voting can be achieved in two different meth-
ods. First one is Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) which
refers to a combination of mechanical, electromechanical
or electronic equipment that define ballots, record and
count votes and display election results in a predetermined
public area [39]. This machine can be a customized voting
machine with touch screens or a stand-alone PC and
placed in a voting booth. The second one is electronic
distance voting, an improvement over EVM in that the
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1. INTRODUCTION
Electronic voting has been already used by several 
countries (e.g. Norway, Estonia etc.). There can be many 
advantages over the traditional paper-based systems like 
security, reliability, convenience, mobility, tally speed, 
cost-effectiveness, and flexibility if the system is carefully 
designed. Up to now, cryptographers have been trying to 
improve the feasibility of voting systems by satisfying 
the required security properties such as vote privacy, 
correctness, verifiability and receipt-freeness.
Developing a reliable electronic voting system is known 
as one of the most difficult p roblem f or cryptographers 
since it involves several research fields such as psychology, 
sociology, laws, politics, information security and tech-
nology. It is also unique and intriguing research problem 
in cryptology because malicious behavior can come from 
both insider and outsider; for instance, voters may cheat the
electronic registration, ballot casting, ballot counting are
done in different physical place [39]. It paves the way
for using a more common technology such as telephone,
Short Message Service (SMS), interactive digital TV or
the internet in order to cast a vote from any preferred
distant location. The electronic voting with internet (i-
voting) is the most appropriate and proper voting process
for expatriates. The i-voting process is also easier and
faster than other alternatives but also yields to open new
threat.
Estonia is the first country that is currently using the
internet for general elections since 2005 [3]. Internet
voting is attractive to exclusively the voters who spend
prominent amount of time in order to arrive the polling
station. For instance, approximately half of the Estonian
internet voters pointed out that it would take half an hour or
more to get at the polling station. Most of the voters might
not live in their registered place of residence. They can be
either abroad or living in another place. It is encouraging
to know that Estonia already successfully managed the
internet election project.
The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs has successfully
performed the internet voting for their expatriates residing
abroad [5]. The French internet voting system is provided
by Scytl [37]. During the 2012 French legislative elections,
over 240,000 votes were cast electronically and this
amount represents over 55% of the total overseas votes.
Norway is the second country which used the internet
voting for the local governmental elections in September
2011, and targeting a comprehensive internet voting in
2017 for national election [2]. The cryptographic protocol
used in Norway is implemented by Scytl [37] which is a
Spanish electronic voting company. Norway also benefits
from the Estonian expertise and improves their system
against a stronger adversarial model in which the voter’s
computer is assumed to be malicious. Their internet voting
protocol is strong from several aspects. The most important
feature of this protocol is to resist against malicious voter’s
computers. Unlike the Estonian protocol, the Norwegian
protocol prefers to use two additional channels: pre- and
post-channel that are postal service and SMS respectively.
The purpose of using different channels is to prevent
malicious computer attacks, under the assumption that pre-
channel and post-channel are unlikely to be controlled by
the same attacker that controls the computer. Namely, an
honest voter will be aware of a malicious behavior caused
by the computer during the entire voting procedure. Before
the voting process, voters receive the printed integrity
check codes by the postal service, which is a table with
candidate names, identification numbers and receipt codes.
During the voting days, the voter casts his vote to a
computer, which encrypts the ballot and submits it to a
Ballot Box (BB). To prevent coercions, the voter is able
to cast multiple votes, where the final one will be taken
into account during counting process. BB and a Receipt
Generator (RG) together compute the receipt codes for
the cast vote and sends it to the voter via SMS. The
voter can verify his/her vote by checking SMS against
the printed receipt codes. Once the election time is over,
the cast ciphertexts are decrypted by a Decryption Service
(DS) using re-encryption mix-net for creating integrity
and anonymity. An auditor verifies the correctness of the
entire process. The security of the system depends on the
assumption that BB and RG cannot be both compromised
and cooperate [19, 22].
In [20], Norway internet voting protocol of 2011
was enhanced in terms of computational efficiency. In
this protocol a new novel method has been proposed
for computing the return codes efficiently. The Norway
government ran the trials of this protocol during
the 2013 parliamentary elections. After that, [21]
proposed another instantiation of the cryptographic
protocol fulfilling Gjøsteen’s requirements for security and
functionality. In this protocol, the security proof avoids the
technical obstruction that was encountered by Gjøsteen.
Additionally, this protocol has a better security proof, at
the expense of a small increase in computational cost.
1.1. Related Work
Several electronic voting schemes have been proposed
in the literature. As this paper focuses on internet based
voting schemes, below we only mention some of the well-
known related works on i-voting.
The Rijnland Internet Election System (RIES) is an i-
voting system which is used in public elections (next to
the traditional voting by postal mail) in the Netherlands
in 2004 and 2006. RIES is end-to-end verifiable which
enables the voter to verify whether his/her vote has been
counted as cast. After the source code was published at
June 2008, it has been observed that RIES is vulnerable to
even very simple attacks. For more details and analysis of
RIES we refer to [15].
In [31], the authors highlight the problem of the tallying
complexity in Juels et al.’s [26] first coercion resistant i-
voting protocol. They also examine and determine the key
concept behind the existing protocol which performs the
tallying process in linear time. Then, they propose a new i-
voting protocol which allows efficient vote authorization
with less computation power on the voter’s side. The
protocol is based on adjustable anonymity sets. The size
of the anonymity sets determines the degree of coercion
resistance. They show that their protocol requires linear
time complexity and is comparable with the existing ones.
The Estonian i-voting system and the analysis of
the election results are presented in [38]. In 2011
Parliamentary elections, over 140.000 voters used i-voting
which was about the 24,3% of all votes. Although the
quarters of the voters used Estonian i-voting system it is
not sufficient to fulfill the expected security requirements,
i.e., it does not prevent attacks from voter’s computers. An
attacker can inject malicious code into voters’ computers
to listen to the data and interpret it without being aware of
the voter. That’s why, the authors in this paper conclude
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receipt on the bulletin board, and in this way, can remove
the remaining encryption without being detected. Namely,
the tallying authorities can replace ballots by some new
selected ballots, and by doing this, they can manipulate
the election result without being detected. The authors
show that this simple attack can be applied to several
e-voting mechanisms such as [4, 6, 36]. Furthermore,
in [27], Kusters et al. also propose countermeasures
against this attack. Similarly, [34] applies this attack to
voting mechanism of [33] and propose an enhanced voting
scheme based on utilizing ring signature in the ballot
distribution process where voters are exchanging required
information with the authorities.
As described above, most of the i-voting systems have
either lack of enough security or privacy issue of the
voters. Also, we highlight that most of the proposed
schemes (including the above-mentioned ones) do not
protect against malicious voter’s computers. Norwegian i-
voting system is the only system that prevents the possible
security attacks from malicious voter’s computers.
1.2. Our contributions
In this paper, we focus on the internet based voting
protocol which is tried out in Norway in September
2011 for municipal elections. Note that our contributions
do not collude with other extensions of this protocol.
We investigate the protocol from both theoretical and
practical points of view. The security of the protocol is
based on some strong assumptions that require trust to
organizations. However, these assumptions could make
the protocol less convenient for some countries where the
societies are more skeptic about their vote privacy since
the trust level of these organizations is low. We propose
our solutions to mitigate those issues.
The main contribution of this paper is as follows.
The Norwegian internet voting protocol preserves vote
privacy even if only one of BB and RG is compromised.
However, it assumes that both BB and RG cannot be
compromised and cooperate, otherwise, the vote privacy
will be lost even if the key of DS is not revealed. The
key of DS can be recovered by colluding BB and RG.
This may leave question marks in people’s minds that
decreases the credibility of the system. Motivated by this
problem, we study the simultaneous corruption of BB and
RG. We enhance the protocol that removes the former
assumption without adding a new organization. We show
that the modified protocol provides the vote privacy against
possible this collaboration.
Secondly, we remark that either if the receipt codes are
falsely generated (or falsely printed) or the pre-channel is
not secure, then a vote for candidate ci can be counted
for candidate cj where ci 6= cj without being detected.
In order to avoid this concern, we propose that the
trusted party also prepares and prints non-interactive zero
knowledge proofs of the ballots on the receipt code form.
More concretely, with the help of smart device using 2D
Barcode (eg., QR code), the voter can verify the receipt
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that the level of trust in the voter’s computer should be 
significantly reduced.
The Helios is the first w eb-based, o pen-audit voting 
system to provide solutions for low coercion elections [6, 
7]. A user can set-up an election, invite voters to cast a 
private ballot using a modern web browser with the Helios. 
The user can also calculate a tally, and generate a validity 
proof for the whole process [24]. It has been used in real-
life election by several institutions to elect e.g., (i) the 
board of the International Association for Cryptographic 
Research (IACR) of 2015 [25], (ii) the undergraduate 
student government by Princeton University [23], and (iii) 
the president of the Universite´ Catholique de Louvain [7]. 
Helios 2.0 is based on the homomorphic tallying of 
the encrypted votes, and offers another approach Mix 
networks for the tallying of an election [35].Due to an 
attack by Estehghari and Desmedt [16] Helios 2.0 was 
upgraded to Helios 3.0. In [10], the authors propose a 
new generalized computational security model for ballot 
privacy and then analyze the security of Helios in this 
model. As Estonian Internet Voting system, Helios also 
does not protect against potential malware on the voter’s 
computers.
In [8], the authors introduce a revised version of the e-
valg 2011 project that is an i-voting pilot project for the 
municipal and regional elections of 2011 in Norway. In the 
remote voting system, the client software is responsible 
of encoding the voting choices selected by the voter. In 
order to avoid the need to trust the client software, cast 
as intended verification functionality i s u sed for auditing 
this process. The paper also analyzes the security of the 
proposed functionality.
In [32], the authors debate the validation of transparency 
and the recommended measures meant to establish 
profound trust via analyzing Norwegian internet voting 
project. They also aim to reveal to which degree the voting 
project adheres to those recommendations. They show that 
considerable additional costs and complexity are required 
to achieve transparency and the technical measures. They 
also propose that E-valg project does additional effort in 
order to establish trust despite the majority of public trust 
is supposed to toward central election administration. The 
authors argue that the trust in different entities and the 
limitations of the verifiability are narrowly get into touch 
to public.
Kusters et al. [27] introduce a simple attack, which they 
call a clash attack, on the verification procedure of e-voting 
systems. The purpose of this attack is to force the voting 
machines to utilize a particular randomness r for the same 
candidate during the process of the semantically secure 
encryption, and therefore, the same voting receipt would 
be generated and distributed to different voters. Note that 
using the same randomness would lead to a deterministic 
encryption scheme rather than a probabilistic scheme 
because final e ncrypted v otes ( for t he s ame candidate 
where the same randomness is used) would be identical. 
Hence, the malicious voting authority will keep only one
codes with these proofs whether each code is assigned to
a candidate correctly. This provides voters to ensure the
integrity of the receipt codes before casting their votes, and
the voter can detect any malicious behavior during the vote
casting even if the pre-channel is not secure and voter’s PC
is malicious.
Finally, another minor contribution of this paper is that
having both the printed receipt codes and SMS might be a
potential threat for vote privacy. A voter may disclose his
vote even after the elections. This is not believed to be a
big issue since it is not definite that this vote is indeed the
final one (because a voter can re-vote). However, this might
be a significant issue in practice when it is still possible
to show the voters’ intention. In our protocol, we modify
the verification part where we utilize the SMS only as a
notification mechanism and propose to use a automated
phone call for the complete verification of the votes. This
might prevent (intentional or unintentional) violation of
vote privacy.
1.3. Organization
In Section 2, we give a brief description of the underlying
cryptographic primitives of the proposed protocols. In
Section 3, we first give a succinct description of the
Norwegian cryptographic protocol and show its possible
weaknesses in practice. In Section 4, we propose our new
protocol which avoids the possible cooperation between
BB and RG. We also provide our quick solutions to the
weaknesses described in Section 3. In Section 5, we give
an informal security analysis of our protocol. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2. PRELIMINARIES
We now briefly describe the underlying cryptographic
primitives of the protocols. Given a public key encryption
scheme, letM denote the message or the plaintext space,
C the ciphertext space, and R the randomness. Let c =
E(m; r) depict an encryption of m under the public key
pk where r is a random value. Let sk its corresponding
private key, who allows to the holder retrieve a message
from a ciphertext. The decryption is done with the private
key sk as shown m = D(c).
Threshold cryptosystem. In a (t, n)-threshold cryp-
tosystem there are n participants in total. They want to
distribute the decryption power up-to the agreement of
any subset of (at least) t of them. Informally speaking,
each participant holds a share of the secret key, the overall
secret key is somehow reconstructed to let them recover
the message in a given ciphertext. To encrypt, there is a
public key that is used as in a regular public key scheme.
More formally, let P1, . . . , Pn be the participants. We
define a (t, n)-threshold encryption scheme to be the
public key with the following three phases:
• In the key generation phase, each participant Pi
will receive a pair (pki, ski), where pki and ski
are thought as shares of the public and secret key,
respectively. Then the overall public key pk is
constructed by combining the shares. Finally pk is
broadcast to allow anyone to encrypt messages in
M. The shares of this public key are also broadcast
which allow all parties to check the correctness of
the decryption process.
• The encryption phase is done as in any public
key encryption cryptosystem. If m ∈M is the
message, a (secret) random value r from R is
chosen and c = E(m; r) is broadcast.
• In the threshold decryption phase, given that t (or
more) participants agree to decrypt a ciphertext
c, they follow two steps. Firstly, each participant
produces a decryption share by performing Sij =
Dskij (c), j = 1, . . . , t. After broadcasting Sij ,
they all can apply a reconstruction function R on
these shares so that they can recover the original
message by performing m = R(Sj1 , . . . , Sjt)
where Pj1 , . . . , Pjt represents the group of t
participants willing to recover m.
To withstand with the malicious adversaries, in
the first step, parties have to prove that Sij was
computed using the share of the secret key skij
corresponding to the public value pkij .
• In the case of a (t, n)-threshold scheme, the
additional requirement is that if less than t parties
gather their correct shares of the decryption of
a given ciphertext, they will get no information
whatsoever about the plaintext.
In our voting protocol, we use (2,2)-threshold cryptosys-
tem between BB and RG where both players must cooper-
ate in order to decrypt.
Homomorphic cryptosystem. A public key encryption
scheme is said to be multiplicative homomorphic if
given c1 = E(m1; r1) and c2 = E(m2; r2) it follows that
c1c2 = E(m1m2; r1 + r2). As a consequence, it is also
true that E(m; r)s is equal to E(ms; rs) for a known
integer s. Another consequence of these properties is
the re-randomization of encryptions, by observing that
E(m; r)× E(1; r′) is a new encryption whose plaintext
is again m (and its randomness is r + r′).
Elgamal cryptosystem is one of the most popular partial
homomorphic cryptosystems. In Elgamal cryptosystem,
let G be a cyclic group of order q with generator g.
Then, x ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1} is the secret key and h = gx
mod q is the public key. The encryption of message m is
Enc(m) = (c1, c2) = (g
r,mhr)) for some random r ∈
{0, . . . , q − 1}. The decryption process is done as follows.
The secret owner simply calculates s = cx1 and computes
c2s
−1 which recovers the message m. In the proposed
protocols, ElGamal scheme is utilized as a multiplicative
homomorphic cryptosystem [14]. Also, re-randomization
is being used to be able to shuffle the encrypted ballots.
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Σ-protocols. A Σ-protocol for a relation R = (v;w)
is a three-move (commit-challenge-response) protocol
between a prover and a verifier. Both parties know the
common input v, and the prover has a witness w as
private input, where (v;w) ∈ R. Informally a Σ-protocol
is a zero knowledge proof of knowledge for relation R
which satisfies special soundness and (special) honest-
verifier zero-knowledge. Namely, the prover persuades the
verifier not only of the correctness of a statement, but
also that it possesses the witness w for the statement.
See [12] for further details. The Fiat-Shamir technique
[18] is a famous trick for making such a protocol non-
interactive zero knowledge in the random oracle model,
while preserving the security of the protocol in a practical
manner [17].
As in the internet voting protocol that is used
in Norway, we also use the fact that there are
efficient Σ-protocols for the relation R = {(e;m, r) : e =
E(m, r)} for homomorphic ElGamal encryptions, proving
knowledge of the message m and randomness r for a
given encryption scheme e = E(m, r). In our protocols,
since the voter computes two distinct encryptions of
the same vote, we also need to ensure equality-
composition of Σ-protocols (EQ-ZK) for the relation
EQ-ZK = {(e1, e2;m, r1, r2, k) : e1 = E(m, r1)∧ e2 =
E(mk, r2)}. We also note that OR-composition Σ-proofs
(OR-ZK) is important to use in our protocol to prevent
a malicious voter submitting a fake ballot which is not
in the eligible candidate list. Therefore, the voter should
also prove to BB that his vote f(vj) (where f is a public
encoding function and vj is the j-th vote) is one of the
candidate in {f(v1), . . . , f(vkmax)} where kmax is the
number of candidates, i.e., Σ-protocol for the relation is
shown in Figure 1.
3. NORWEGIAN INTERNET VOTING
PROTOCOL AND ITS POTENTIAL
WEAKNESSES
In this section, we first briefly describe the internet voting
protocol which was experienced in Norway. Next, we
point out the practical issues of the protocol and propose
our quick solutions. For more details of the Norwegian
protocol we refer to [19].
3.1. Protocol description
There are three players (organizations) in this system
which are assumed to be independent and do not collude
maliciously (i.e., Ballot Box (BB), Receipt Generator
(RG) and Decryption Service (DS)). The protocol consists
of three phases: key generation, vote casting and vote
counting. Denote {aj}kmaxj=1 as {a1, . . . , akmax}.
generator g. He then computes y1 = ga1 , y2 = ga2 and
y3 = g
a3 . For each voter Vi, he chooses a random si
and a pseudo-random function instance di. He computes
γi = g
si and generates the receipt code list RCi =
{(vj , f(vj)si)}kmaxj=1 where f is an encoding function and
kmax is the number of candidates. Before the elections,
RCi is sent to the voter over the pre-channel (i.e.,
postal service), (y1, a2, y3, {(Vi, si)}) is given to BB, and
(y1, y2, a3, {(Vi, γi, di)}) is given to RG.
• Voter and PC. In order to cast a vote,
Vi selects (v1, . . . , vk) from the candidate
list O = {1, . . . , kmax} where vi ∈ O.
PC sets vk+1 = vk+2 = . . . = vkmax = 0.
Then, PC encrypts the vote f(vj) as
(xj , wj) = (g
tj
1 , y
tj
1 f(vj)) ∀j = 1, . . . , kmax
where tj ∈R Zp. PC also proves the
correctness of his computations by Σ-
protocols OR-ZK, EQ-ZK using Σi =
{Vi, {(xj , wj)}kmaxj=1 ; {tj}kmaxj=1 , f(vj)} and
signs as σVi = SignVi(Vi, {(xj , wj)}kmaxj=1 ,Σi).
PC sends (Vi, {(xj , wj)}kmaxj=1 ,Σi, σVi ) to BB.
• Ballot Box. BB first verifies the OR-ZK, EQ-ZK
proofs using Σi and the signature σVi to check
whether the computations are done correctly. BB
then stores counter++i , Vi, {(xj , wj)}kmaxj=1 ,Σi,
and σVi . For each Vi, it computes (x˘i, w˘i) =
(xsij , (wjx
−a2
j )
si) for j = 1, . . . , kmax and sends
these values to RG.
• Receipt Generator. RG computes r˘j = w˘j x˘−a3j
∀j = 1, . . . , kmax. RG signs as σiRG =
SignRG(Hash(Vi, {(xj , wj)}kmaxj=1 ),Σi, σVi)
and sends σiRG back to PC. RG also generates SMS
= (r˘1, . . . , r˘k) and sends it to Vi via SMS.
Once the SMS is received, Vi first verifies σiRG. Next, Vi
verifies (v1, r˘1), . . . , (vk, r˘k) which is received via SMS
channel and {(vj , f(vj))si} which is received via postal
service. If there is a mismatch, Vi observes that there is a
problem with his vote. This means that either there exists
a malware in the voter’s computer or the data has been
changed during the data transmission.
Audits and Vote counting protocol. The auditor must
approve the input from BB before the decryption of the
encrypted ballots. DS decrypts the encrypted ballots sent
by BB by his private key a1 and shuffles the result before
output. DS also proves to the auditor that the output ballots
are indeed the encrypted ballots.
3.2. Potential weaknesses of the protocol
3.2.1. A practical issue with the threshold.
The protocol described in Section 3.1 is a (2,3)-
threshold cryptosystem among the playersBB,RG andDS
[19]. However, since DS can also decrypt by his private
key a1 this system is not really a (2,3)-threshold scheme.
If BB and RG are compromised and collaborate then the
private key of DS can be obtained, and therefore, vote
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Key generation. Key generation is assumed to be 
done by a trusted party. The trusted party chooses
random values a1 and a2, and compute a3 = (a1 +
a2) mod q for some order q of a group G with
OR− ZK =
{
(ej , e
′
j , {mj}kmaxj=1 ; rj , r′j , kj) :
kmax∨
j=1
(
ej = E(mj , rj)
∧
e′j = E(m
kj
j , r
′
j)
)}
.
Figure 1. Σ-protocols for OR Zero-knowledge (OR-ZK) relation
privacy can be easily compromised. This part of the system
might be weak since the threshold is very small.
One may come up with a questioning that there might
be a cooperation between BB and RG, and argue that
the anonymity of the election could be easily violated.
Since it is not easy to refute those claims, the trust of
the society may decrease dramatically. The reason is that
there are only two players (BB and RG) in the system.
Note that these players are required to be physically and
organizationally separate (if they are not, they are not
really two distinct players). Since in practice, the number
of distinct and independent organizations available are
very small, it is also not desirable to introduce new players.
In Section 4, we propose our improved protocol which
is slightly modified version of the Norwegian protocol.
Our protocol preserves vote privacy even if there is a
cooperation of BB and RG without new additional players.
3.2.2. A practical issue with holding both SMS
and the receipt codes.
Once the election is over, there should be no way to
reveal the voter’s intention. However, having both the
receipt codes and SMS gives a potential threat to vote
privacy. That means, many people in fact carries their votes
in their pocket. This part of the protocol might be very
sensitive since any voter having mobile phones and the
receipt paper can show his vote to anyone including his
friends, colleagues and family members. Note that this
issue is not the case with the conventional paper-based
elections.
Indeed, one may argue that this problem can be avoided
by re-voting. However, in general, re-voting is used either
in the case of malicious computers or coercions. Besides
that, there are not expected to exist many coercions and
malicious computers, and therefore, not many people are
going to vote more than once. This might be a serious
problem and the system might open the door to a new
threat. Hence, this adversarial behavior might be realistic
in many commercial, political, and in social settings.
Therefore, it is better to construct a mechanism where the
votes can be verified by only a limited number of times
(e.g., only once) by the voters. The solution to this issue is
described in our enhanced protocol in Section 4.5.1.
3.2.3. A problem of an insecure pre-channel.
The problem could exist when the printed receipt codes
are either falsely generated (or falsely printed) or falsely
sent to the voters via a malicious pre-channel [22]. In this
case, the verification will fail immediately in the case of
honest voter’s computer. This situation can dramatically
decrease the reliability of the system.
On the other hand, if the wrong receipt code is
received by the voter and the computer is malicious,
the entire voting system can work subtly without any
detection. To illustrate this issue, we give the following
scenario. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
there are only two candidates (v1, v2) (e.g., Yes/No
referendum) and the following receipt codes RCi =
{(v1, f(v2)si), (v2, f(v1)si)} is sent to voter Vi (which
is changed during either printing the codes or the postal
service). Assume that the voter chooses the candidate v1.
When the voter casts his vote, a malicious PC encrypts
f(v2) instead of f(v1). PC sends the encrypted vote
(xj , wj) = (g
tj , y
tj
1 f(v2)) together with its Σ-proofs
to BB. BB checks whether the computations are done
correctly if so, computes (x˘i, w˘i) = (xsij , w
sia2
j ) sends
it to the RG. Finally, RG computes the receipt r˘j =
w˘j x˘
−a3
j → f(v2)si} ∀j = 1, . . . , kmax and sends them
to Vi via SMS. The voter checks whether the receipt code
sent via SMS is the expected one. It can be easily seen that,
the voter has chosen the candidate v1 and PC encrypted
v2 but the voter could not detect any problem since the
receipts are equal. Hence, DS decrypts it to v2 instead of
v1 even though the voter had intention for candidate v1, BB
and RG could not also detect any problem. The solutions
to fix this issue are given in our enhanced protocol in
Section 4.5.2.
4. THE ENHANCED PROTOCOL
4.1. Overview of Our Protocol
In this section, we propose our protocol, which is a slight
modified version of the Norwegian protocol. This protocol
preserves a possible cooperation between BB and RG
without introducing new players. Similar to the Norwegian
protocol, we have the same three players in our protocol.
We highlight that the ballots are encrypted by the public
key y1 = ga1 . The encryptions are decrypted by BB and
RG in such a way that the voter verifies the correctness.
The same encryptions are also decrypted by DS. Similarly,
we follow the same form of the underlying cryptosystem
except that BB and RG share a private and a public key
pair. Unlike Norwegian protocol, we give a new public
and private key pair to DS. Hence, in our scheme we
completely separate the keys of BB and RG from DS.
Before the system setup, the key generation phase
is executed by the Electoral Board as follows: BB and
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Figure 2. Key Distribution in our protocol. PC chooses random `i privately, encrypts f(vj)`i under the public key pk1 and f(vj)
under the public key pk2 together with the EQ-ZK proof that the two encrypted messages are actually the same. Additionally, PC also
proves with OR-ZK that the encrypted message is one of the candidate list {c1, · · · , ckmax}.
RG share private key pairs c1 and c2 respectively.
The corresponding public key is h1 = gc1+c21 . Unlike
Norwegian Protocol [19], the decryption server DS will
have different key pairs for a homomorphic cryptosystem.
Let α ∈ Zp denote the private key of DS. Then, the
corresponding public key is h2 = gα2 (see Figure 2).
Our proposed scheme is divided into two main
procedures: (i) vote casting/verification (ii) vote counting.
Before the elections, the voters receive the printed pre-
receipt codes (e.g., by postal service). In the printed form,
the pre-receipt codes would be also encoded as visual 2D
Matrix such as Data Matrix [1]. This visual matrix will
be used during the vote verification by the voter via smart
phone. Considering the vote casting, the main difference
between our protocol with the Norway voting protocol is
that in our protocol PC blinds the vote against BB and RG.
In the first step of the vote casting, the voter chooses the
candidates (v1, v2, . . . , vkmax ) on PC. Then, PC prepares
two set of encryptions. For the first set of encryptions, PC
chooses a random value `i in order to blind (mask) his
votes (f(vj)`i∀j = 1 . . . k) and then encrypts the blinded
votes with the public key of BB and RG. Even if BB and
RG cooperate they cannot learn any information about the
votes since they are already blinded. Next, PC computes
the second encryption of the same votes (but this time
without mask) with the public key of DS. The PC also
proves with equality zero-knowledge (EQ-ZK) that the
encrypted votes are the same. BB and RG decrypt the first
encryption and send the post-receipt code to the voter via
SMS the voter’s smart phone. Note that, blinding votes
changes the result of the receipts (r˘j) and RG would
generate r˘`ij instead of r˘j and sends r˘
`i
j . Now, the voter
actually has the pre-receipt code as vj , f(vj)si and post-
receipt code (r˘`ij ). For the verification, the smart phone
reads the `i from the PC’s screen and the voter’s selected
receipt codes (f(vj)) via 2D barcode scanner (e.g, QR
code) . The application will compute (f(vj)si)`i and
compare these results with the post-receipt coded received
by SMS. If the verification is passed by the voter with the
help of the smart phone, the second encryption which used
the public key of DS are sent for decryption and counting.
4.2. Our Main Protocol
The details of the protocol are as follows. For the
illustration of the protocol see Figure 3.
4.3. Vote casting protocol
1. Vote casting
• Voter Vi chooses (v1, . . . , vk) from the
candidate list O = {1, . . . , kmax}.
• PC then computes vk+1 = vk+2 = . . . =
vkmax = 0. For each candidate, PC chooses
a masking value `j ∈R Zp and encrypts the
vote as (xj , wj) = (g
uj1
1 , h
uj1
1 f(vj)
`j ) for
uj1, ∀j = 1, . . . , kmax.
• PC also encrypts (aj , bj) =
(g
uj2
2 , h
uj2
2 f(vj)) for uj2 ∈R Zp.
• PC also proves the correct-
ness by Σ-protocols Σi =
{Vi, g1, g2, h1, h2, {(xj , wj), (aj , bj)}kmaxj=1 ;
{uj1, uj2}kmaxj=1 , f(vi), `j}
and signs as σVi =
SignVi(Vi, {(aj , bj), (xj , wj)}kmaxj=1 ,Σi).
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Voter (Vi + PC) Server (BB + RG)
Public key of BB and RG: h1 (= g
c1+c2
1 ) Private shares of BB: c1, si
Public key of DS: h2 (= gα2 ) Private share of RG: c2
Codes via pre-channel: {(vj , f(vj)si)}kmaxj=1 Private key of DS: α
# of candidates: kmax Public key of RG: γi (= g
si
1 )
1. Phase: Vote casting
Vi Select candidates (v1, . . . , vk)
PC computes vk+1 = vk+2 . . . = vkmax = 0
PC computes:
uj1, uj2 ∈R Zp
`j ∈R Zp
(xj , wj) = (g
uj1
1 , h
uj1
1 f(vj)
`j )
(aj , bj) = (g
uj2
2 , h
uj2
2 f(vj))

kmax
j=1
PC computes OR-ZK, EQ-ZK using Σi = {Vi, {(xj , wj), (aj , bj)}kmaxj=1 ; {(uj1, uj2)}kmaxj=1 , f(vi), `j}
PC signs: σVi = SignVi(Vi, {(xj , wj), (aj , bj)}kmaxj=1 ,Σi)
−−−−−−−
Vi, {(xj , wj), (aj , bj)}kmaxj=1 ,Σi, σVi−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
2. Phase: Verification and Signature
BB verifies the OR-ZK, EQ-ZK proofs using Σi and the signature σVi
BB stores: counter++i , Vi, {(xj , wj)}kmaxj=1 ,Σi, σVi
BB computes: (x˘i, w˘i) = {(xsij , (wjx−c1j )si)}kmaxj=1
BB sends (x˘i, w˘i) to RG.
RG computes: r˘j = (w˘j x˘−c2j ) ∀j = 1, . . . , kmax
RG signs:
σiRG = SignRG(Hash(Vi, {(xj , wj), (aj , bj)}kmaxj=1 ),Σi, σVi)
←−
σiRG−−−−−−−−
←− SMS−−−−−−−
3. Phase: Verification
Vi verifies σiRG
Vi computes r′j = (f(vj)
si)`j ∀j = 1, . . . , k
Vi verifies (v1, r′1), . . . , (vk, r′k) ∈ {(vj , f(vj)si`j )}kmaxj=1
Figure 3. Protocol diagram of our vote casting protocol.
• PC sends Vi, {(aj , bj), (xj , wj)}kmaxj=1 ,Σi, σVi
to BB.
2. Verification and Signature by BB and RG
• BB verifies the OR-ZK, EQ-ZK proofs using
Σi and the signature σVi .
• BB stores counter++i , Vi, {(xj , wj)}kmaxj=1 ,
Σi, and σVi .
• BB computes (x˘i, w˘i) =
{xsij , (wjx−c1j )si}kmaxj=1 and sends it to
RG.
• RG computes the post-receipt codes as
r˘j = w˘j x˘
−c2
j ∀j = 1, . . . , kmax. Note that
unlike Norwegian protocol, pseudo-random
function di is not required in our protocol.
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The reason is that BB and RG do not
learn any information about voter’s intention
because of his masking technique.
• RG signs as σiRG =
SignRG(Hash(V, {(xj , wj)}kmaxj=1 ),Σi, σVi)
and sends σiRG back to PC.
• RG sends r˘j ∀j = 1, . . . , k to the voter via
SMS.
3. Verification by the voter
• Vi verifies σiRG.
• Vi also verifies the post-receipt codes
(v1, r˘1), . . . , (vk, r˘k) which are received
via SMS and the pre-receipt codes
{(vj , f(vj))si} which is received via
postal service as follows: Vi computes
r′j = f(vj)
si`j ∀j = 1, . . . , k and checks
whether r′j is equal to r˘j .
• If there is a mismatch, Vi observes that
there is a problem with his vote. This means
that either there is a malware in the voter’s
computer or the data has been changed during
the data transmission.
Note that similar to the Norwegian protocol we have
also used SMS in our protocol. We can of course adapt
the phone call procedure to prevent the practical issue with
the SMS described in Section 3.2. Namely, RG sends SMS
in the second phase of the protocol which contain only the
received-notification of the vote, saying “Dear Voter, You
have voted successfully on 15.09.2011 at 23:59:59. Please
call 999 0 999 for the verification of your vote.”.
4.4. Vote counting protocol
Our vote decryption and counting protocol is exactly the
same with the Norwegian protocol except that DS will
use his own private key in order to decrypt (aj , bj).
Namely, for each voter Vi, BB sorts all the recorded
list {counteri, {(aj , bj)}kmaxj=1 ,Σi, σVi}, finds the largest
for verification. The voter asks any 4 positions of the
receipt codes (e.g., the 1st, 5th, 8th and 9th positions) from
the operator. These 4 positions are randomly chosen to
simplify the verification for the ordinary voters in order
to avoid asking the complete codes. The operator tells
the characters (e.g., alphanumeric) in those 4 positions.
The voter verifies his vote correctly in case the codes
match, otherwise he observes that the vote has not been
successfully sent to BB. In the latter case, after taking
necessary precaution the voter should re-vote. At the end
of the voting time, the verification process is also closed.
As we said before, the voter should only a limited number
of times for every cast ballot (e.g., only once). In fact,
this may not be an absolute solution, however, in many
practical cases it does go a long way towards reducing
the severity of the intentional and unintentional privacy
violation.
4.5.2. Solution to insecure pre-channel.
For the solution of the problem described in 3.2.3,
we propose two different possible solutions to avoid this
concern.
• The first possible solution is that the trusted
party (electoral board) generates the printed receipt
codes together with non-interactive Σ-proofs during
the key generation. Once the codes (xj , yj) =
(vj , f(vj)
si) are generated, the proofs assure the
voter that the discrete logarithm to the base f(vj)
of yj is known. In this way, it is impossible
to swap the codes without detection. Note that
this verification need not to be done for each
voter, instead, a sufficient number of voters will
already imply that the codes are generated and
sent to the voters correctly. This verification can be
checked by independent organizations, universities
or experts of political parties who have sufficient
ability to check the correctness of the proofs. The
requirement of the pre-channel is that the receipt-
codes should not be known by the voter’s computer.
For example, the voter can obtain and easily check
the correctness of the Σ-proofs from a different
computer (or a smart phone) than the one used for
vote casting so that the verification can be computed
by an ordinary voter [22].
• Another possible solution could be suggested in
such a way that the encryptions (together with Σ-
proofs) can be prepared by the voter in a (simple)
secure machine dedicated to this process that has no
connection with his PC [22]. This proof should be
prepared in such a way that the user is able to verify
easily. The voter can put this value into a computing
device by means of for example a barcode or
RFID system. In this way, it is impossible for the
malicious computer to learn and change the vote
without any detection. PC sends the encryptions to
BB which will forward to RG after the necessary
calculations. RG will finally return the receipt code
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sequence number counteri and adds to a list L = 
{(aj , bj )}. BB finally s ends L  t o DS w hich t hen mixes 
the encrypted vote list and proves the correctness to the 
auditors. Auditors involve in verifying in every step of the 
computations. Finally, votes are decrypted and counted.
4.5. Other Improved Extensions
4.5.1. SMS for only notification purpose.
In our protocol, we propose changing the structure of 
SMS as follows: once the voter casts his vote, an SMS will 
be sent to his mobile phone except that it will not contain 
the receipt code. In our proposal, SMS will only include a 
notification message for each cast vote. This notification is 
indeed necessary in order to prevent a malicious computer 
casting a vote without the knowledge of the voter. In 
order to verify a vote, we propose to use a phone call 
as an additional channel. More precisely, once the voter 
casts his vote for a candidate, he directly calls a number
via SMS. The voter then checks whether this value
is the same as the one received via post-channel.
We highlight that the software on this machine
should be open source so that anyone can check the
correctness of the code which will be really simple,
since it only does ElGamal encryption with non-
interactive Σ-proofs. However, this solution can be
difficult to perform for an ordinary voter. Still, it
could be more convenient and easier than checking
the correctness of the entire software of the voting
system.
4.6. Computational Analysis
The original Norwegian Internet voting has been
performed in practice. Regarding the security and privacy
of voter, the computational complexity of the protocol is
not much high for both client and server side. On the
other hand, with our new instantiation the computational
complexity increases, but also has increased security of
the system. The PC computes extra the number of kmax
modular exponentiation and EQ-ZK proofs. Smart device
application also computes the number of kmax modular
exponentiation for verification of vote via the receipt codes
and the secret `. Since the verification is not compulsory
for every voter and the correctness of the scheme will be
ensured with high probability if about % 5 of the voters
perform the verification process. These computations are
reasonable for a personal computer and a smart device.
Therefore, we believe that the system will still be practical
and quite effective with our extension.
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we informally analyse the security of our
protocol against active attacks. We first highlight that
the differences between our protocol and the Norwegian
protocol are adding a masking technique by the voter
and separating distinct keys between BB, RG and DS.
In the Norwegian protocol, the scheme uses (2,3)-
threshold cryptosystem (with the condition that a1 + a2 =
a3 mod q) whereas in our protocol, BB and RG use a
(2,2)-threshold cryptosystem which are only responsible
for generating a pre-receipt code, verifying the encrypted
votes and returning a post-receipt code to the voter. In
the usual case the encrypted votes are sent to DS for
decryption and counting processes. We note that in each
step of the protocol the parties must prove with zero
knowledge that they have executed the protocol correctly.
Informally, vote privacy is achieved if (1) a ballot cannot
be linked to the voter who cast it, and (2) no voter can
prove that he/she voted in a particular way [9]. In [13],
Delaune, Kremer and Ryan states that “to ensure privacy
we need to hide the link between the voter and the vote and
not the voter or the vote itself”. In this context, disclosing
only the identity of the voter or the vote itself does not
compromise vote privacy since the only requirement in
terms of privacy is to break the link between the voter and
the vote. In this respect, instead of user anonymity that
defined in [30, 28, 29], we aim to achieve vote privacy
against BB, RG and DS.
Theorem 5.1
Our protocol achieves vote privacy even if the Ballot Box
and the Receipt Generator are corrupted simultaneously
and maliciously collude.
Proof sketch.
BB proves the correctness of its computations to RG.
Namely, BB must send the signed ballot to RG, and
also prove that (x˘i, w˘i) is computed correctly. This proof
prevents a malicious BB cooperating with a malicious
voter from misusing the receipt generator’s decryption
capability. In order to verify the computation of BB,
RG must receive the entire ballot, including the voter’s
signature and the computer’s proofs of knowledge. RG
verifies the voter’s signature and the proofs, and then
computes a hash of the ballot which is then given to the
voter as a second receipt to verify whether the vote has
been received correctly. RG also returns the message to
BB which forwards it to the voter’s computer. Without this
signature, the voter’s computer will not inform the user that
the ballot has been accepted.
If BB and RG are corrupt and cooperate, they can
learn only the encrypted value (xj , wj). However, since
this value has been masked by the voter’s randomness `j
the privacy of the voter will still be maintained. Besides
that, the other encryption (aj , bj) does not give any
information to BB and RG since it is encrypted by the
public key of DS. Besides, if the corrupted BB listens
the communication between RG and the voter via SMS
channel it does not get any information since the vote has
been already masked. In the Norwegian scheme a pseudo-
random function di is used to ensure this.
Theorem 5.2
Our protocol disallows a corrupted PC (or a malicious
voter) to submit a valid vote vj encrypted by the public
key of BB and RG and a fake vote v /∈ {v1, . . . , vkmax}
encrypted by the public key of DS without being detected.
Proof sketch.
Following the Norwegian protocol, digital signatures are
used to prevent BB ballot from inserting forged ballots and
a malicious voter claiming that a given ballot belongs to
someone else. It also guarantees that at most one ballot is
counted per voter. Besides that, PC proves the knowledge
of the ciphertexts (xj , wj) and (aj , bj) with the proof of
knowledge [12]. EQ-ZK proofs using Σi also assure that
the votes inside the encryptions (xj , wj) and (aj , bj) are
equal to each other. Intuitively, these proofs are required in
order to prevent a corrupt computer (or voter) submitting
a valid vote vj which is encrypted by the public key of
BB and RG and a fake vote v′j /∈ {v1, . . . , vkmax} (e.g.,
a random message) which is encrypted by the public key
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6. CONCLUSION
The Norwegian internet voting protocol which was
experienced in 2011 and 2013 is rather strong compared
to other similar kind of known protocols. However, apart
from its strengths, the protocol still has some potential
weaknesses regarding its following assumptions: (i) BB
and RG cannot be compromised and cooperate at the
same time (ii) keeping both the printed receipt codes
and SMS does not violate the vote privacy (iii) the
receipt codes are printed and sent to the voters securely.
Although the overall protocol is secure under these strong
assumptions, we modified the protocol to improve its
reliability and verifiability to make it more robust without
these assumptions. More concretely, we have shown that
our enhanced protocol ensures vote privacy even if there
is a simultaneous corruption and cooperation between BB
and RG.
Moreover, considering the Norwegian protocol, a voter
can reveal his vote if he carries both SMS and the receipt
code in his pocket, even elections has ended. This may
cause a quite serious threat that opens the door for selling
vote or intentional revealing. Therefore, we suggested to
use SMS only as a notification message. In order to verify
the vote, we use a automated phone call channel. We
believe that this mechanism would provide an interesting
alternative approach to receiving SMS that prohibits the
voter to reveal his/her vote.
REFERENCES
1. ISO/IEC 16022:2006—Data Matrix bar code sym-
bology specification, 2006.
2. Final results from the e-voting in the trial municipal-
ities in Norway, September 2011.
3. Internet voting in Estonia. June 2011.
Website: http://www.vvk.ee/
voting-methods-in-estonia/engindex.
4. Wombat Voting system, 2011. Website: http://
www.wombat-voting.com/.
5. FRENCH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS:
French expats vote online in 2012 legislative
elections, 2012.
6. Ben Adida. Helios: web-based open-audit voting.
In Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security
symposium, pages 335–348. USENIX Association,
2008.
7. Ben Adida, Olivier De Marneffe, Olivier Pereira,
and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. Electing a university
president using open-audit voting: analysis of real-
world use of helios. In Proceedings of the 2009 con-
ference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on
trustworthy elections, EVT/WOTE’09, pages 1–15.
USENIX Association, 2009.
8. Jordi Puiggali? Allepuz and Sandra Guasch Castelli.
Internet Voting System with Cast as Intended
11
of DS. OR-proofs also prevent a corrupt voter submitting 
a fake candidate instead of encrypting a valid candidate.
The voter’s PC uses the exponent `j to randomize his 
vote f(vj ) and encrypts with the public key of BB and 
RG. In return, he receives f(vj )`j si . With the help of a 
smart device, the voter uses computes the exponent `j of 
the printed receipt codes to verify whether his vote was 
stored correctly. Even if there is a cooperation between BB 
and RG they cannot send a different valid code and learn 
the vote without bypassing the voter unless they solve the 
discrete logarithm problem.
The Decryption Service. DS is a reasonably standard 
system consisting of a mix-net followed by verifiable 
decryption [11]. This part of the system is exactly the same 
as the Norwegian protocol except that it decrypts (aj , bj ) 
using a key α.
The Auditors. Our scheme (as well as the Norwegian 
scheme) provides cast-as-intended property where the 
voters are able to verify that their ballot was cast as 
intended to the BB. Furthermore, we would like to clarify 
that the security of DS is also equivalent to the Norwegian 
voting system. The goal of the Norwegian protocol (and 
our protocol as well) is to transmit the encrypted votes 
to the DS securely. The counting process utilizing DS is 
in fact performed via a ceremony. Namely, the decryption 
key of DS is distributed to independent authorities in a 
threshold fashion by utilizing mix-nets (via semantically 
secure threshold encryption scheme). The link between the 
votes and the voters are broken via mix-nets (i.e., mix-net 
roughly works as follows: each independent authority first 
randomly mixes the votes, randomizes the encryptions, 
and then proves in zero-knowledge that the new fresh 
encryptions are equivalent to the given encrypted votes). 
Moreover, auditors are participated into vote tallying 
process in order to verify and guarantee the fair of 
counting. The auditors check the validity of the content 
of the ballot box (i.e., the signatures and the proofs) that 
no ballot has been inserted, removed or lost according 
to the receipt generator list. The auditors compare this 
list to the ciphertexts input to the mix-net and verify the 
proofs. Because of auditors and the keys are distributed 
to independent parties, the counting process is completely 
secured if at least one of them is honest.
Note that all of the existing i-voting systems are 
susceptible to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In case 
of DoS attacks voters would have to use the traditional 
paper voting in the polling station. Also, mitigating to a 
man in the middle is not possible for the Norwegian i-
voting system since RG sends the voter a message over 
post-channel verifying his/her vote. This message would 
be difficult to spoof because of the sufficiently long random 
codes on the paper which is sent over the pre-channel.
Verification. In 3rd International Conference on
E-Voting and Identity, Tallin, Estonia, VoteID’11.
Springer-Verlag, 2012.
9. Emmanue Benoist, Bernhard Anrig, and David-
Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle. Internet-Voting: Oppor-
tunity or Threat for Democracy?, pages 29–37.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg,
2007.
10. David Bernhard, Ve´ronique Cortier, Olivier Pereira,
Ben Smyth, and Bogdan Warinschi. Adapting helios
for provable ballot privacy. In Computer Security
– ESORICS 2011, volume 6879 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 335–354. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2011.
11. Dan Boneh and Philippe Golle. Almost entirely
correct mixing with applications to voting. In
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer
and communications security, CCS ’02, pages 68–77.
ACM, 2002.
12. Ronald Cramer, Ivan Damga˚rd, and Berry Schoen-
makers. Proofs of partial knowledge and simplified
design of witness hiding protocols. In Proceedings of
the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference
on Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO ’94, pages
174–187. Springer-Verlag, 1994.
13. Ste´phanie Delaune, Steve Kremer, and Mark Ryan.
Verifying Privacy-type Properties of Electronic
Voting Protocols. Journal of Computer Security,
17(4):435–487, December 2009.
14. Taher El Gamal. A public key cryptosystem and
a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms.
In Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in
cryptology, pages 10–18, New York, NY, USA, 1985.
Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
15. Berry Schoenmakers Engelbert Hubbers,
Bart Jacobs and Henk van Tilborg. Description
and Analysis of the RIES Internet Voting
System. EIPSI, 2008. Website: http:
//www.win.tue.nl/eipsi/images/RIES_
descr_anal_v1.0_June_24.pdf.
16. Saghar Estehghari and Yvo Desmedt. Exploiting
the client vulnerabilities in internet e-voting systems:
hacking helios 2.0 as an example. In Proceedings
of the 2010 international conference on Electronic
voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections,
EVT/WOTE’10, pages 1–9. USENIX Association,
2010.
17. U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness indistinguishable
and witness hiding protocols. In Proceedings of the
twenty-second annual ACM symposium on theory of
computing, STOC ’90, pages 416–426. ACM, 1990.
18. Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. How to prove
yourself: practical solutions to identification and
signature problems. In Proceedings on Advances in
cryptology—CRYPTO ’86, pages 186–194. Springer-
Verlag, 1987.
19. K. Gjøsteen. Analysis of an internet voting protocol.
2010. Website: http://eprint.iacr.org/
2010/380.
20. Kristian Gjøsteen. The norwegian internet vot-
ing protocol. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive,
2013:473, 2013.
21. Kristian Gjøsteen and Anders Smedstuen Lund.
The norwegian internet voting protocol: A new
instantiation. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive,
2015:503, 2015.
22. Sven Heiberg, Helger Lipmaa, and Filip Van Laenen.
On e-vote integrity in the case of malicious
voter computers. In Proceedings of the 15th
European conference on Research in computer
security, ESORICS’10, pages 373–388. Springer-
Verlag, 2010.
23. Helios Headquarters, Princeton University
Undergraduate Student Government, 2016. Website:
https://princeton.heliosvoting.
org/.
24. Helios Voting, 2016. Website: http:
//heliosvoting.org.
25. International association for cryptologic research,
2015. Election page at: http://www.iacr.
org/elections/2015.
26. Ari Juels, Dario Catalano, and Markus Jakobsson.
Coercion-resistant electronic elections. In Proceed-
ings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the
electronic society, WPES ’05, pages 61–70, New
York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM.
27. R. Kusters, T. Truderung, and A. Vogt. Clash attacks
on the verifiability of e-voting systems. In 2012 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 395–409,
May 2012.
28. Yanrong Lu, Lixiang Li, Haipeng Peng, and Yixian
Yang. An anonymous two-factor authenticated key
agreement scheme for session initiation protocol
using elliptic curve cryptography. Multimedia Tools
and Applications, pages 1–15, 2015.
29. Yanrong Lu, Lixiang Li, Haipeng Peng, and Yixian
Yang. An energy efficient mutual authentication
and key agreement scheme preserving anonymity for
wireless sensor networks. Sensors, 16(6):837, 2016.
30. Yanrong Lu, Lixiang Li, Haipeng Peng, and Yixian
Yang. Robust anonymous two-factor authenticated
key exchange scheme for mobile client-server envi-
ronment. Security and Communication Networks,
9(11):1331–1339, 2016.
31. Reto Koenig Michael Schla¨pfer, Rolf Haenni
and Oliver Spycher. Efficient Vote Authorization
in Coercion-Resistant Internet Voting. In 3rd
International Conference on E-Voting and Identity,
Tallin, Estonia, VoteID’11. Springer-Verlag, 2012.
32. Melanie Volkamer Oliver Spycher and Reto Koenig.
Transparency and Technical Measures to Establish
Trust in Norwegian Internet Voting Authors. In 3rd
International Conference on E-Voting and Identity,
12
Tallin, Estonia, VoteID’11. Springer-Verlag, 2012.
33. H. Pan, E. Hou, and N. Ansari. E-note: An e-voting
system that ensures voter confidentiality and voting
accuracy. In 2012 IEEE International Conference on
Communications (ICC), pages 825–829, June 2012.
34. H. Pan, E. Hou, and N. Ansari. Re-note: An e-voting
scheme based on ring signature and clash attack
protection. In 2013 IEEE Global Communications
Conference (GLOBECOM), pages 867–871, Dec
2013.
35. Damien Giry Philippe Bulens and Olivier Pereira.
Running mixnet-based elections with helios. In
Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic
voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections,
EVT/WOTE’11. USENIX Association, 2011.
36. Ronald L. Rivest and Warren D. Smith. Three voting
protocols: Threeballot, vav, and twin. In Proceedings
of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic
Voting Technology, EVT’07, pages 16–16, Berkeley,
CA, USA, 2007. USENIX Association.
37. Scytl. A Secure Electronic Voting Company. 2016.
http://www.scytl.com/.
38. Peeter Laud Sven Heiberg and Jan Willemson.
On applying i-voting for Estonian Parliamentary
elections in 2011. In 3rd International Conference
on E-Voting and Identity, Tallin, Estonia, VoteID’11.
Springer-Verlag, 2012.
39. Jo¨rgen Svensson and Ronald Leenes. E-voting in
Europe: Divergent democratic practice. volume 8,
pages 3–15. IOS Press, April 2003.
13
